Christmas in February: Federal Circuit Upholds $71M Artificial Tree Patent Verdict

3.11.26

On February 17, 2026, the Federal Circuit affirmed a $71.4 million judgment against Polygroup Ltd. for infringing Willis Electric Co. Ltd.’s artificial pre-lit Christmas tree patent, rejecting challenges to both obviousness and the admissibility of Willis’s damages expert, Ms. Riley.

First, the Federal Circuit affirmed the denial of JMOL on obviousness, holding that substantial evidence supported the jury’s finding of no motivation to combine the prior art.

Second, the Federal Circuit affirmed the admissibility of Ms. Riley’s testimony because Ms. Riley employed recognized apportionment methods and a Georgia-Pacific analysis. The Court recognized that reasonable minds could differ as to the proper calculation within a recognized framework for a reasonable royalty, and it thus viewed Polygroup’s criticisms on the application of accepted methodology as directed to the weight of the evidence rather than admissibility. In doing so, the Court reinforced the distinction under Rule 702 between admissibility and credibility of expert testimony and expressly distinguished this case from its recent decision in EcoFactor v. Google. 137 F. 4th 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2025). Unlike the facts of EcoFactor that concerned the expert’s opinion relying on an inaccurate characterization of evidence, the facts here concerned whether the expert’s method for calculating a royalty was the best approach or could have been characterized more precisely. As such, the Court reiterated that a district court’s gatekeeping role is limited to ensuring methodological reliability, while disputes over how an expert applies accepted methods, particularly in a reasonable royalty analysis that “necessarily involves an element of approximation and uncertainty,” are for the jury.

Accordingly, this case further develops the Court’s precedent after EcoFactor, highlighting that EcoFactor’s importance was for courts to perform their gatekeeper function where the very foundation of the expert’s opinion—such as mischaracterizing the evidence on which the opinion relies—is flawed. EcoFactor cannot be used as a proxy to prevent a party from presenting contrary opinions with which the moving party simply disagrees about the conclusions drawn from the analysis. This principle is particularly true for analyses involving approximations on which reasonable minds can disagree. Resolving any disagreement in such situations is the role of the jury, not the courts.

Summer Basham Todd | Associate Attorney